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Abstract 
Generalizing the dynamics implied by power transition theory, we characterize the structural 
conditions that lead nations to initiate conflict or choose to integrate.  The relationship between 
changes in relative power, hierarchical structures, and joint satisfaction are used to identify the 
structural conditions for conflict and cooperation. Empirical tests for the last two centuries 
confirm the strength and robustness of this characterization. In addition, long term assessments 
of Pax Britannica, the Cold War, and China’s potential challenge to the United States in this 
century are used to illustrate the precision of these findings. The fundamental implication is that 
structural conditions provide the pre-conditions for conflict and cooperation, but decision makers 
have leeway in advancing policies that eventually lead to either war or peace.   2
INTRODUCTION 
This paper characterizes the structural conditions that lead nations to either initiate 
conflict or choose to integrate. Starting with the generalized dynamics implied in the power 
transition theory as developed over the last 45 years (see Organski 1958; Kugler and Lemke 
1996, 2000; Tammen et al. 2000) we extend its explanatory range from an assessment of conflict 
to an understanding of conflict and cooperation. The empirical assessments demonstrate that 
these dynamics identify the structural conditions that culminate in decisions to engage in war on 
one extreme and integration on the other.  
First, consistent with the expectations of Organski (1958) and Organski and Kugler 
(1980), we formalize the power dynamics that describe the interactions between major powers. 
Second, congruent with the insights of Lemke (2002) and Lemke and Werner (1996), we 
generalize the model to account for similar dynamics in regional interactions. Our work provides 
a structural explanation for the propensity of a dyad of countries to either cooperate or engage in 
conflict.
1  
Empirical analysis demonstrates that the set of credible policy options available to 
decision makers is constrained by relative power, satisfaction with the dyadic status quo, and 
limits imposed by global and regional hierarchies.  A dissatisfied, initially less powerful   
challenger will compete for control of the global or regional hierarchy as it approaches power 
parity and has the ability to do so successfully. A satisfied challenger, one comfortable with the 
relationships within the hierarchy, is less likely to seek a conflictual approach to reorder the 
dyadic relationship. As a satisfied challenger approaches power parity, parties are likely to 
resolve disputes peacefully, allowing integration to emerge as an option. Here these two central 
arguments are specified and tested.    3
 
POWER TRANSITION DYNAMICS IN WAR AND PEACE 
Early power transition theory suggests that a number of factors cause the likelihood of 
war to vary with the stages of development (Organski 1958; Organski and Kugler 1980). The 
most basic proposition is that war is most likely to occur when the relative power of two 
competing nations approaches parity. However, the dynamics of power do not account for the 
full story.  A second fundamental proposition is that nations do not interact in anarchy. Rather, 
the dominant nation establishes the status quo and persuades some to join and be satisfied with 
the existing order. The potential challenger has two options.  A dissatisfied challenger whose 
preferences for the ordering of the international system differ substantially from the dominant 
order seeks to alter the status quo. Conversely, a satisfied challenger whose preferences for the 
ordering of the international system are closely aligned with the dominant nation seeks to 
preserve the status quo or may attempt to alter the existing order by cooperative means.
2  The 
policy options presented by these two different interactions differ substantially. When parity 
approaches, a dissatisfied challenger is likely to challenge and may wage war against the 
dominant nation. Under similar conditions, a satisfied challenger may seek integration (Tammen 
et.al. 2000)
 3.  
In addition to power and status quo dynamics, power transition theory includes the 
concept of hierarchal relationships among global powers.  We focus on ordering within 
hierarchies to determine the role of hierarchies in cooperation and conflict. An unordered 
hierarchy emerges when most nations hold roughly equal shares of power.  Unordered 
hierarchies represent the most likely conditions for conflict and the least likely conditions for 
integration, as nations in such hierarchies face few constraints beyond their power and   4
satisfaction. In the absence of a regionally dominant country supporting the status quo, 
competition among two or more contenders emerges as they vie for control of the region.   
Conflict is more likely to occur within an unordered hierarchy as each contender with different 
interests and incentives attempts to impose its influence upon the region. Confrontational 
conditions can be compounded within an unordered hierarchy; the largest regional powers are 
more likely to have acrimonious relationships in the absence of a well-defined status quo as they 
approach  parity with each other.  Smaller nations are also likely to have contentious relations 
because no single nation has the capability to absorb the costs of cooperation while the larger 
powers focus on protecting themselves from emerging regional challengers.  In this context even 
when nations are satisfied with each other, cooperation is less likely.  
Ordered hierarchies are characterized by power concentrated in the hands of a dominant 
global or regional power who establishes and supports the status quo. In structural environments 
where the dominant nation is at least twenty percent stronger than any contender, the hierarchy is 
deemed ordered (Organski and Kugler 1980). The dominant nation can spend more of its 
resources ensuring the best support possible for the economic and political terms established in 
the status quo. In such an environment war may be waged, but it is less likely and will result in 
relatively low casualties – as is the case in the ongoing “war against terrorism”. Even if the 
smallest nations are dissatisfied, they are unlikely to adopt policies that contradict the interests of 
a dominant nation that is both geographically proximate and could easily defeat them in a 
military conflict.  
   5
THE ELEMENTS OF THE MODEL 
Here we develop  the structural dynamics governing dyadic relationships that create the 
preconditions for national participation in either conflict or cooperation.
6 We track the dyads 
through all stages of relative power to test the performance of this specification for all  global 
and regional challengers and defenders for the last two centuries.  This section describes in detail 
the variables used in this characterization and presents the model’s specification. 
 
Conflict and Cooperation 
The first piece of the puzzle relates to the Conflict-Integration Continuum, represented as 
CI.  Large values of CI indicate an increase in the intensity of conflict, with a state of war 
emerging at the upper end of the scale. Likewise, as the values decrease, the greater the intensity 
of cooperation, with integration at the lowest end of the measure. Neutrality rests at the center of 
measure.  
We construct a noval range variable to represent the likelihood of either war or 
integration. The theoretical variable ranges from 0 to 5, with extreme cooperation represented at 
0 in the range and extreme conflict at 5. The measure captures the relative propensity toward 
each extreme, i.e. the intensity of integration and the likelihood of war or integration. This scale 
is constructed from two very different scales. Estimates between 2.5 and 5 are taken from the 
Hostility Level data provided by the COW project. This variable is a 5-point interval level 
scoring, with each point representing a more intense military dispute. It has been normalized so 
that it varies between 2.5 and 5, but retains intensity to reflect intervals—i.e. the distance 
between 0, 1, 2, etc are not equal distances.
7  We transform this data to reflect intensity more 
effectively. Goldstein (1992) surveyed a panel of foreign policy experts—averaging their   6
weighting of events—so that he could classify WEIS events on a conflict-cooperation scale 
ranging from –10 (extreme conflict) to 10 (extreme cooperation). The degree of hostility 
characterized by COW’s hostility level score can be fit into his scaling of WEIS events, so that a 
modified version of the hostility level will transform it into interval-level data.  
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
Table 1 shows the resulting score used in our conflict-integration scaling and further 
transforms the 0 to –10 range defined by Goldstein into a 2.5 to 5 range so it matches the 
theoretical model.  
The second half of the conflict-integration variable represents increasing intensities of 
integration. The integration data are taken from Genna (2002) and Efird and Genna (2002). The 
measure categorizes the degree of economic integration between dyads based on five economic 
and political categories. These data are a continuous aggregation of scores structured so that they 
vary between 0 and 5. Again the data have been transformed so that they now vary between 0 
and 2.5, with smaller numbers representing intense integration.  
Relative Power 
 
Relative Power is the objective ability of one nation to impose its preferences on the 
opponent by persuasion if possible and by force if necessary. The measure of power is the COW 
project’s capabilities index that incorporates both economic and military components. Past work 
on power transition relies on GDP,  but high quality data on this variable for the entire set of 
countries since 1816 is not available. The measure of power is the COW project’s capabilities 
index that incorporates both economic and military components.
9  
We measure relative power for each dyad-year, and examine only the interval where 
nations are within 20 percent of the dominant nation in the globe or region in order to model the   7
ability to explain nations with similar power levels.
10  This constraint focuses on the transition 
period from a dominated to preponderant challenger and captures the essence of power transition 
theory. 
Status Quo 
Status quo represented as S, is the joint satisfaction of the challenger and defender with 
their dyadic relationship. The status quo used here reflects the set of similar policies and 
preferences for each dyad. The degree of satisfaction with this dyadic status quo measures the 
gains and losses attained directly from the interaction by each participant. Despite its importance, 
little is known about what causes changes in satisfaction. Speculation surrounding the changes in 
satisfaction is attributed to emerging similarities in political systems (Lemke and Reed 1996), 
governance structures (Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson, and Smith 1999), or cultural 
factors (Tammen et al. 2000).  Thus, while the status quo can be identified empirically, little 
consensus exists regarding factors determining variation in satisfaction or dissatisfaction.
11 
The measure used for satisfaction used reflects an assessment of the dyadic status quo, 
rather than an assessment of the degree of satisfaction with the system leader. Using the work of 
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita (1981) and extended in Morrow (1987), we argue that satisfaction 
with the status quo relies on the similarity of alliance portfolios. Dyads with similar portfolios 
are regarded as satisfied with each other’s view of the international system or dyadic 
relationship, and those with dissimilar portfolios are regarded as less satisfied with each other. 
Signorino and Ritter (1998) show that the original a tau-b measure does not assess the 
hypothesized similarity as accurately as the S-statistic proposed. We rely on Tucker’s (1999) 
computations of the S-statistic for all alliances since 1816, and EUGene is used to aggregate the 
data into dyadic format (Bennett and Stam 2000a).
12   8
Hierarchy 
Two hierarchy terms are needed to reflect the difference between the perceptions of 
members of any dyad.  The hierarchy for the challenger HC and the dominant nation HD,   
approximate the order imposed by the global or regional hierarchy due to the degree of power 
concentration. Low values indicate that the hierarchy is ordered or dominated, while high values 









min Re  
Despite persuasive arguments about the importance of hierarchies (Organski and Kugler 
1980), previous literature on power transitions treats hierarchy as a constant and does not explore 
the effects of variations in structural arrangements. Here we illustrate its importance.  
Following Lemke (1995, 2002) we extend the theory beyond the set of great powers to 
regional hierarchies.  Regional hierarchies define the set of politically relevant dyads that can 
credibly interact. Each of the continents and the Middle East are used as regions to reflect the 
standard definition used by the Correlates of War project. So that these regions are not over- 
aggregated, we break down the Americas region into North and South America, and break down 
the Asian region into Asia and Oceania/South Pacific. 
Small values of the variable suggest a more constrained hierarchy dominated by a powerful dominant 
country. Larger values suggest a less ordered hierarchy with broader competition between regional members. The 
variable is computed by taking the COW capabilities of the dominant regional member with the most capabilities 
over the summation of the COW capabilities of the next four largest regional contenders. The most dominated 
regions approach zero and the least dominated regions approach one.  
 
STRUCTURAL DYNAMICS OF CONFLICT AND COOPERATION   9
 
To capture the dynamics of the generalized power transition theory, the following 
relationship is proposed based on the elements identified in the previous section: 
( ) D c H H RP S RP CI + + − =
3  (1) 
      CI ≡ degree of conflict or integration, where  5 0 ≤ ≤ CI , such that 
  where     0 =  full integration, moving from 0 to 2.5 reduces the intensity of cooperation 
      2.5 = neutrality, moving from 2.5 to 5 increases the severity of conflict 
      5.0  = most severe conflict  
RP ≡ relative power,  2 0 ≤ ≤ RP , such that 
  where  0 = preponderant defender 
      1 = contenders at power parity 
      2  = preponderant challenger 
 
S   ≡ satisfaction with the dyadic status quo, where  5 . 0 ≤ ≤ S , such that 
  where  0 = complete dissatisfaction 
                 .5 = complete satisfaction  
HC  ≡ hierarchical constraint for challenger, where  1 0 ≤ ≤ C H , such that 
  where  0 = dominated hierarchy and  
              1 = unordered hierarchy 
HD   ≡ hierarchical constraint for defender, where  1 0 ≤ ≤ D H , such that 
  where  0 = dominated hierarchy  
              1 = unordered hierarchy   10
The functional form in (1) is selected to reflect the arguments power transition theorists 
have been making for the last 45 years. This formulation captures the arguments presented in the 
theory within a single equation. When nations are not completely dissatisfied (when S>0), the 
cubed RP term shifts the highest propensity for conflict to just past the parity point, and reflects 
the theory’s anticipated curvature for the conflict-cooperation relation with respect to relative 
power. A linear RP term in the interactive portion of the equation would underestimate the 
influence of relative power because it will treat each unit of increase in RP equally, and would 
not suggest the curvature of the interaction. Squaring the term would not shift the peak of the 
likelihood of conflict in relation to the parity point. By cubing the term, greater asymmetry 
improves the likelihood of cooperation assuming that the dyad is somewhat jointly satisfied, 
especially when dyads are highly asymmetric.   
Further congruence between the theoretical and stated model can be noted. Organski 
(1958, 333) argued that the dissatisfied challenger is most likely to initiate conflict just prior to 
the transition point—based on the observation that this was the only way for Germany to be 
defeated twice in three decades. However, this initial claim was altered in more recent versions 
of the theory. Organski and Kugler (1980, 59) found that the dissatisfied challenger initiates 
conflict after the transition. Bueno de Mesquita (1985), Kugler and Zagare (1990), Bueno de 
Mesquita and Lalman (1992), Alsharabati (1997) show that the defender does not preempt the 
challenger because it is risk averse, values the status quo, and prefers to postpone action once 
early opportunities are bypassed. In a contested dyad, the challenger is willing to take risks, and 
since its highest likelihood of success is after the point of parity, then the peak in the likelihood 
of conflict occurs just after the transition point.
13    11
Moreover, the cubed RP term highlights the importance of satisfaction in the interactive 
term. The more dissatisfied the challenger and the lower the values of S, the longer it takes 
during the power transition process for the likelihood of conflict to be reduced. At the extreme, 
when nations are completely dissatisfied (when S=0), the challenger has a monotonically 
increasing desire to initiate conflict as the RP term increases, reflecting its increasing likelihood 
of capitalizing on the growing opportunity to redress grievances imposed by the defender 
provided by its increase in relative power.  
This formulation allows us to reconcile some seemingly important discrepancies. Bueno 
de Mesquita (1990), for example, argues that the Seven Weeks’ War between Austria and 
Prussia occurred at the power parity when both nations were satisfied, yet they still waged war. 
Our generalized approach accounts for this discrepancy. The likelihood of conflict was low and  
the structural constraints imposed on the situation kept the severity of the war limited. Thus a 
very limited conflict ensued and the outcome was accepted despite the capability of both sides to 
escalate. The interactive term allows for a small probability of conflict during a power transition 
between two satisfied nations, but anticipates that the intensity of such an unlikely conflict would 
be far lower that when between two dissatisfied nations (see Figure 1 below). 
An important and unexpected result of adopting the proposed specification is that 
integration is most likely to occur at periods of power asymmetry. The most likely time for 
integration is in the post-transition period, asymmetric when the challenger and defender are 
jointly satisfied. Having worked through differences during the transition period, the two 
contenders are now set to bear the costs of integration. Deutsch et al. (1957) empirically 
observed that there were no occurrences of integration when all the nations were at parity.   12
Instead, they observed that integration occurs around “cores of strength” (1957, 28), which 
points to a need for dominant nation as a “nucleus” for integration (1957, 38).  
This formulation allows the hierarchy terms to modify the likelihood of conflict or 
cooperation independently, unevenly affecting the challenger and defender. The domination of a 
hierarchy by a single country imposes higher costs for any conflict within that hierarchy, as well 
as lower costs for integration. The higher costs of conflict are associated with the dominant 
power’s desire to maintain a peaceful status quo, which is consistent with stable economic 
growth. The lower costs of integration reflect the regional dominant power’s ability to absorb the 
costs of integration being comparatively larger than the other nations in its region. 
 
CHARACTERING THE DYNAMIC MODEL 
The dynamic relationship between satisfaction, relative power, and the conflict-
integration continuum is summarized in Figure 1 for unordered hierarchies and Figure 2 
for ordered, dominated hierarchies. The horizontal axis represents the relative power of 
the challenger versus the defender, so that the left extreme, the defender is dominant 
relative to the challenger and at the right extreme, the challenger is preponderant over the 
defender. The depth axis represents the degree of joint satisfaction. At the back end of the figure, 
nations are jointly dissatisfied, while at the front end of the figure they are jointly satisfied. 
Finally, the vertical axis represents the degree of conflict-cooperation among the competitors. 
Higher points on this vertical axis reflect conflictual behavior, increasing in intensity and 
likelihood as the surface approaches the top of the figure. Midrange points reflect a band around 
0 where nations are more likely to be neutral. Finally, the lowest points on the vertical axis 
reflect increasing intensity and likelihood of integration.   13






Figure 1 shows that there is little variation in either the likelihood or intensity of conflict-
cooperation in the case of a preponderant defender (on the right side of the surface). Neutrality is 
the likely outcome.  As the relative power of the challenger increases, the degree of conflict also 
increases. The more capable the challenger is vis-à-vis  the defender, the more likely the 
challenger is to use military force to correct the source of its dissatisfaction.  
An empirically rare phenomenon is anticipated when the challenger is preponderant and 
dissatisfied (back right corner of the surface). The defender is likely to make concessions and 
satisfy its now-more powerful opponent, either through a war nearer to parity or through 
accommodation after parity. Empirically, Britain faced this situation during the Munich Crisis 
prior to the outbreak of World War II. Similarly, once the challenger reaches preeminence there 
is no reason to wait any longer to force a change in the status quo defined by the previously 
dominant nation.  
  As we move forward on the surface, the likelihood of conflict decreases as a result of 
the reduction in the degree of dissatisfaction. Indeed, less intense dissatisfaction assumes 
the more traditional form of the power transition argument. The peak of the intensity of 
conflict tends to be around parity, while the need to correct some grievance for the 
previously dominated challenger is reduced as it becomes more satisfied and more 
preponderant. The extreme example of this is the very rare incidence of integration in the   14
front, right-hand corner of the surface. Integration is most likely after a power transition 
between jointly satisfied countries. At this point in the surface, the two countries have a 
history of cooperative relations and have passed through the most dangerous time in 
dyadic relations: the transition from dominance by one power to another. Note that 
integration now may take place when either the defender or challenger is preponderant. 
[Figure 2 about here] 
  Figure 2 shows the effects of the most dramatic hierarchical constraint: a dominated 
hierarchy, to illustrate the greatest possible impact of the hierarchy. Once again, the major 
impact is the downward shift in the elevation of the surface. As in the previous surface, 
integration is possible when either the challenger or defender is preponderant. Indeed, when the 
defender is preponderant, the challenger may be forced to cooperate even if it is dissatisfied with 
the dyadic relationship. 
We believe this formal presentation of Power Transition represents effectively the 
traditional arguments made thus far, and extends these arguments logically from conflict to 
integration. Our next step is to assess their strength against the empirical record.  
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Previous attempts to test the Power Transition propositions have taken shortcuts with 
respect to the representation of the theory, without capturing the precise functional form of the 
theorized relationship. There are many examples of incomplete tests of power transition theory 
including Bremer (1996), Kugler and Lemke (1996), Houweling and Siccama (1988, 1996), 
Geller (1993, 1996), Kim (1989, 1991, 1992, 1996), Kim and Morrow (1992), Lemke (1993, 
1995, 1996), Lemke and Werner (1996), and Werner and Kugler (1996). These studies find that   15
power parity combined with dissatisfaction provides a decisive contributing factor to the 
initiation of war. However, they evaluate the effects of parity as a dummy variable—which 
misses the interesting effects associated with the dynamics of relative power over the whole 
range of possible relationships, they apply the notions of power transition theory to war events 
only, failing to assess the effects of the shape of hierarchy reflected in the theoretical arguments. 
We incorporate these elements in our empirical analysis.  
The empirical side of the power transition empirical research program has come under criticism 
because it has generally aggregated dyad-years into 5-, 10-, 15-, and 20-year intervals. Since our 
interest is in developing a closer description of the dynamic process driving the likelihood of war 
and peace, we choose instead to use annual data to more precisely capture the changes in relative 
power in relation to the likelihood of war and peace. 
The first test focuses on Great Power dyad-years from 1816-1996. We use the definition 
of Great Powers established by the MIDs data set (Jones, Bremer, and Singer 1996), which are 
the top 5 nations in the world system at any given time. This test evaluates the fit of the model to 
the original propositions generated for the global region. The second test focuses on all dyads 
including all politically relevant minor powers—assessing the general explanatory power of the 
model for the global and regional hierarchies.  
This section focuses on the application of the model to the degree of conflict and 
integration. We estimate the following statistical model: 
CI = β1⋅RP - β2⋅S⋅(RP
3) + β3⋅RPc*Hc + β4⋅ RPd*Hd + ε    (2) 
The constant term is excluded to conform more closely to the proposed model. Table 2 presents 
the results for Great Powers in Model 1 and all politically relevant dyads in Model 2.    16
[Table 2 about here] 
The results demonstrate that this characterization successfully accounts for the incidence 
of both conflict and integration over the last two centuries. The adjusted-R
2 shows that the model 
explains over 80% of the variance for both the global and regional hierarchies. All coefficients 
take the expected sign, are highly significant, and have relatively small standard errors. 
The relative power term is positive and highly significant. This confirms the implication 
that challengers are more likely to initiate as they grow larger vis-à-vis the defender. Again as 
anticipated, in both levels of aggregation the interactive term is negative and is also highly 
significant. This suggests that while relative power is more important, challenges occur in the 
presence of dissatisfaction and parity, and integration occurs in the presence of asymmetry and 
high levels of satisfaction—particularly after a power overtaking. 
As expected, the hierarchy terms are positive and highly significant. The coefficient for 
the defender’s hierarchy constraint is much larger than for the challenger’s hierarchy constraint, 
demonstrating that regional hierarchies affect defenders more than challengers.  This result flows 
naturally from the argument that defenders are risk averse, and therefore more likely to respond 
to regional constraints than are challengers, who are risk acceptant since they have more to gain 
from a reordering of the status quo (Kugler and Zagare 1965).  
 
SIMULATING THE POWER TRANSITION DYNAMIC 
How well does this model account for specific historical dyadic relationships? Recall that 
the dependent variable is the cooperative-conflictual behavior that nations engage in. Our results 
demonstrate that discrete events such as war and integration can be effectively viewed as part of 
a continuous process that is conditioned in large part by the underlying relative power, the   17
hierarchical structure, and the joint degree of satisfaction among competitors. Clearly, structures 
are important but do not determine outcomes. Integration and war are discrete events. Using a 
continuum to characterize these discrete events indicates when the structural conditions for 
conflict or integration are ripe, and the relative propensity and likely severity for such events.  
Systemic evaluations allow foreign policy analysts, therefore, to identify those time periods that 
are of particular concern because the prospects of severe wars are high. Similarly, this analysis 
identifies periods of particular promise where the conditions for cooperation and integration are 
present.  
In this spirit of pre-condition we use the model to look at three critical great power dyads.  
First, we assess the relationship between the United Kingdom and Germany from 1815-1995. 
This covers the two major power transitions and World Wars in the latter half of the 19
th and first 
half of the 20
th centuries. Secondly, we assess United States-Russian/USSR dyad from 1900-
1995. This period covers the super-power rivalry during the Cold War that dominated foreign 
policy in the 20
th century. Finally, we use the model to forecast the prospect for conflict or 
integration during the anticipated transition between the US and China in the 21
st century. 
 
United Kingdom-German Dyad 
  Figure 3 utilizes the coefficients in Model 1 of Table 2 to simulate changes in the levels 
of the dependent variable over time. The relative power and hierarchy constraints are fixed at 
actual historical levels, but the figure reflects the entire range of satisfaction scores to indicate 
what may have been possible to implement by decision makers given a different set of policies. 
The line indicates the path actually taken by each dyad superimposed over the model’s full range 
of prediction of conflict-integration given the full range of joint satisfaction scores.    18
[Figure 3 about here] 
Figure 3 shows that the Britain and German had an opportunity between 1815-1870 to 
either integrate or to engage in conflict because the structural conditions were ripe for either 
cooperation or confrontation. Indeed a possibility of settlement and potential integration seems to 
have emerged prior to the Franco-Prussian war of 1870. However, Germany’s integration 
following the Franco-Prussian war of 1870 produces fundamental structural changes. Germany 
emerges as a direct competitor gaining on England in terms of relative power. Non-cooperative 
behavior emerges during this period as Britain does not persuade Germany to become a partner 
in running Europe. Instead, Britain partners with the smaller but dissatisfied France, which had 
lost Alsace-Loraine in 1870 to Germany. Under these circumstances, the two contenders were 
structurally constrained to the degree that they faced only conflictual options. Given these 
conditions it is not unexpected that eventually decision makers chose to wage World War I and 
then World War II to alleviate Germany’s dissatisfaction with the status quo advocated by 
British.  
Following World War II, the dynamics of relative power again favor Germany. After 
1953 the UK was again in relative decline with respect to Germany, which overtook the British 
in the early 1960s. However, satisfaction with the status quo dramatically increased in this period 
because of the establishment of a democratic Federal Republic of Germany. Moreover, the US-
led global hierarchy was far more ordered than the structure following World War I. Thus, the 
conditions for integration were present. Although Germany and the UK did not take full 
advantage of structural opportunity for integration until the early 1990s, the success of the EU is 
consistent with these structural conditions, as is the absence of a major war within Europe. This   19
very rough sketch of the structural opportunities for cooperation and conflict between British and 
German seems to correctly account for the major events that occurred between 1815 and 1995.   
 
United States-Russia/USSR Dyad 
Figure 4 shows the range of possible relations between the United States and the USSR. 
Once again, the model’s prediction based on actual level of joint satisfaction is superimposed on 
the full range of options to indicate the path actually followed. Both nations languished in the 
periphery of the global system until 1918, or perhaps even 1938, because of the long shadow of 
Pax Britannica.  
[Figure 4 about here] 
  Figure 4 indicates that relations between these two giants could easily have been 
conflictual or cooperative. Following World War I, both fought against Germany. The US 
intervened during the Russian Revolution for a short time in a futile attempt to reverse the rise of 
Communism. Again, during World War II, both nations collaborated in an effort to defeat 
Hitler’s Germany, only to part company immediately after their biggest triumph. 
  During the Cold War period, attempts by either side to reduce tension produced limited 
reductions in conflict, but unlike the British-German interaction, the structure of the US-USSR 
relationship could easily allow for either cooperation or conflict. Thus, while the British-German 
rivalry was based on structural differences that could not be reconciled by policy means, the US-
USSR relationship could be settled through active foreign policy and a reconciliation of 
preferences. Indeed this was the case following the collapse of the USSR. The United States did 
not take advantage of this rapid decline to destroy the previous challenger. Rather, the US   20
adopted a conciliatory policy that may in the long term produce a true reconciliation among these 
nations.  
The fit in this period is less convincing than for the previous dyad. Counter-intuitively, 
after 1992, the model anticipates that the structural potential for conflict rises once again even 
though the potential for extreme cooperation is also present.  Russian decline in power relative to 
the US—which should reduce the level of potential conflict – is insufficient to reduced the area 
of conflict. The reason for this is that the regional hierarchy for Russia became less ordered as a 
result of the Russian decline, imposing fewer constraints on Russia and increasing the potential 
for regional conflict that could involve the United States. Thus, the model captures the regional 
instability following the collapse of the USSR, but in our judgment does not give full credit to 
the reduction in tensions between the two great powers. 
 
US-China Dyad 
Figure 5 provides a forecast of the range of possible relations, given all possible levels of 
joint satisfaction, between the US and China through 2050. To provide a forecast of the set of 
possible relations, we used the growth trajectory suggested by Tammen et al. (2000) for the next 
50 years and the consequent change in regional hierarchical constraints implied by this 
trajectory.  
[Figure 5 about here] 
The forecast is very sensitive to changes in the level of satisfaction over the entire 
interval. The implication is that different foreign policy stances by the US toward China can be 
decisive in the choice between conflict or integration. Specifically, a reconciliation of 
preferences between the US and China will be very important in preventing war and achieving a   21
structurally stable peace. If the US and China are satisfied with the status quo, then high levels of 
cooperation are possible by 2050 avoiding the possibility of conflict. If, on the other hand, the 
two nations are dissatisfied with each other, a major war between these two nuclear powers 
remains a distinct possibility.  
In today’s context the choice between China as a “Strategic Partner” and China as a 
“Strategic Competitor”  looms large. Indeed, if the first posture is adopted, then cooperation and 
even integration can be envisaged. If the second posture prevails, then the likelihood of a new 
Cold War with potentially far more serious consequences than the US-USSR confrontation 
remains possible.  
This forecast is particularly troubling because China, unlike the USSR, is expected to 
overtake the United States in power sometime in the middle of this century and because of the 
differences in income per capita between these two societies the prospects for very different 
perceptions of an acceptable status quo remain high (Tammen et al. 2000). Under the structural 
conditions outlined, only concerted efforts by both sides to reconcile differences in preferences 
will preserve peace. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
This paper suggests a precise formal characterization of power transition theory that 
extends the argument to include power dynamics and hierarchy changes to account for both 
cooperation and conflict. The series of surfaces that represent the dynamic relation between 
relative power, satisfaction, hierarchies, and the intensity of conflict and integration provide the 
logical connections suggested by the theory and cast them in consistent and readily testable 
terms. By precise specification of power transition theory, we are able to generate a truer test of   22
the theorized relationship between relative power, evaluations of the status quo,  regional 
hierarchies, and conflict-cooperation.  
The empirical reported results are robust. We demonstrate that it is important to 
incorporate the status quo as well as the notion of hierarchical constraints into the calculus of 
war and integration. Additionally, it is critical to consider the relative power of nations. Our 
findings demonstrate that not all international politics, as many contend, are a simple extension 
of local politics. Domestic politics and decision makers can influence the relationship between 
nations at times, but they are affected and constrained by the structure of the international 
system. Our results show that the power relationships between nations and within regions 
overwhelm the role played by domestic actors. Aversion of military disputes and encouragement 
of integration requires understanding and the ability to take advantage of favorable evaluations 
of the status quo that allow preferences to be reconciled. The alternative is to prevent economic 
convergence, generating immense dissatisfaction and increasing the likelihood of war.    23
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Appendix 
THE INTEGRATION ACHIEVEMENT SCORE DESCRIPTION 
The level of regional integration is referred to as the integration achievement score (IAS), first 
developed by Hufbauer and Schott (1994). The calculation of the IAS in their work involves a 
smaller number of regional integration organizations for 1994. The current method adopts their 
initial framework and expanded the time period to include each year of the organizations from 
their implementation dates through 2000. The IAS is an index of six categories that measure the 
level of regional integration. Each category has a value of 0 (low) through 5 (high) along a 
Guttman scale. The following are the six categories that make up the index: 
1)  Free movement of goods and services (G&S) 
2)  Free movement of capital (FK) 
3)  Free movement of labor (FL) 
4)  Supranational institutions (SP) 
5)  Monetary coordination (MC) 
6)  Fiscal coordination (FC) 
 
Each category (Ci) is given a value (see Table A-1 for more detail), all six are summed, and then 








Different methods to calculate the score produced similar results using variables from the Penn 
World Tables as predictors.  Also robustness tests indicate that the variable does not depend 
upon any single category more than the others.   29
Table A-1 
Integration Achievement Score (coding system) 
 
1. Trade in Goods and Services 
0 = No agreements made to lower tariffs and non-tariff barriers 
1 = Preferential Trade Agreement 
2 = Partial Free Trade Area 
3 = Full Free Trade Area 
4 = Customs Union 
5 = No barriers among member countries 
 
2. Degree of Capital Mobility 
0 = No agreements made to promote capital mobility 
1 = Foreign Direct Investment allowed in limited form 
2 = Capital withdrawal allowed 
3 = Full access for foreign investment and capital withdrawal, except for national government procurement 
4 = Full capital mobility expect for large scale merges and acquisitions 
5 = Full capital mobility without restriction 
 
3. Degree of Labor Mobility 
0 = No agreements made to promote labor mobility 
1 = Right of movement granted for select professions 
2 = Full right of movement 
3 = Transferability of professional qualifications granted 
4 = Transferability of pensions and other retirement devices 
5 = Full freedom of movement 
 
4. Level of Supranational Institution Importance 
0 = No supranational institutions 
1 = Establishment of nominal institutions 
2 = Information gathering and advisory role 
3 = Ability for institutions to amend proposals 
4 = Ability for institutions to veto proposals 
5 = Supranational institutions operate as primary decision node 
 
5. Degree of Monetary Policy Coordination 
0 = No monetary policy coordination 
1 = Consultation regarding policy 
2 = Commitment to maintain parity  
3 = Coordinated interventions 
4 = Regional Central Bank establishment 
5 = Single currency 
 
6. Degree of Fiscal Policy Coordination 
0 = No fiscal policy coordination 
1 = Consultation regarding policy 
2 = Commitments regarding deficit spending and taxation 
3 = Sanctions regarding breaking commitments 
4 = Uniform tax code 









0 No  event  0  2.5 
1  No militarized action  -2.4  3.1 
2  Threat to use force  -5.8  3.95 
3  Display of force  -7.6  4.4 
4  Use of Force  -8.3  4.575 
5 War  -10.0  5.0 
 
Table 1. Conversion of COW Hostility Scores to Goldstein-WEIS Scaling   31
Table 2 
 
  Model 1  Model 2 
Level of
Aggregation  Great Powers  Politically Relevant Dyads 
Relative Power  2.350*** 1.616*** 
(COW Capabilities)  (.1341) (.0296) 
Satisfaction*Relative Power
3  -1.148*** -.765*** 
(Alliance S-Statistic)  (.0849) (.0239) 
Hierarchy Constraint  .480** 1.170*** 
(Challenger’s Region)  (.1557) (.0250) 
Hierarchy Constraint  3.127*** 2.552*** 
(Defender’s Region)  (.1658) (.0213) 
Adj. R
2  0.8852 0.8298 
F  2814.36*** 42132.63*** 
Root MSE  1.4173 1.2125 
N  1460 34,557 
Notes: coefficients reported, standard errors in parentheses, *: p<0.05, **: p<0.01, ***: p<0.0001 
 
Table 2. Results on Integration-Conflict Continuum, 1816-1996
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Figure 1. Relationship Between Relative Power, Satisfaction, and Degree of Conflict-Cooperation for an 
Unordered Hierarchy   33
Figure 2. Relationship Between Relative Power, Satisfaction, and Degree of Conflict-
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Figure 3. Historical Simulation of UK-German Dyad, 1815-1995   35














































































Figure 4. Historical Simulation of US-Russian/USSR Dyad, 1900-1995   36















































































Figure 5. Forecast of US-Chinese Dyad, 1995-2050   37
Endnotes 
 
1 Efird and Genna (2002) demonstrate the theory’s empirical ability to explain regional integration.   
2 In rare cases, both the dominant and challenger nations dissatisfied with their dyadic status quo and their 
interactions resemble true anarchy. Here war is both likely and intense. (Tammen, et al 2000). 
3 The use of structural constraints to explain cooperative events has been used with some success to explain regional 
integration. (Haas 1961, Puchala 1971, Schmitter 1971, Mitrany 1975, Caporaso and Keeler 1995, O'Brien 1995, 
Haggard 1997, McCall 1976, Axline 1994). 
6 At present we are not modeling the decision making process underlying this dynamic process, but work in this 
direction can be found in Alsharabati (1995); Alsharabati, Kugler, and Volden (1999); and Kugler, Swaminathan, 
and Tammen (2001). 
7 Thanks to Glen Palmer for sharing this observation. 
9 High quality data on GDP for the entire set of countries since 1816 is not available however tests with the subset 
available show results are consistent. 
10 Since most Great Powers do not have more than 200% of the GDP of their competing Great Powers, this is not a 
severely limiting assumption. Furthermore, power transition theory has always had its greatest difficulty in 
explaining the behavior between vastly-asymmetric dyads. Our findings confirm the weakness in applying the 
theory to such dyads. 
11 This problem is similar to that faced by micro-theorists in their analysis of preferences that once given can be 
analyzed with sophisticated decision making tools like game theory. 
12 See Efird (2001) for sensitivity analysis using the tau-b scores, as well as using the Gartzke, Jo, and Tucker (1999) 
satisfaction measures using UN voting patterns. The empirical results are unchanged with these alternatives. 
13 Also consistent are Schweller’s (1992) arguments on the lack of motivation for democracies to fight preventive 
wars and Geller’s (1996) conclusion based on the likelihood of war outcomes.  